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ON COMPARING BUDDHISM Al'�D CHRISTIANITY 
l\1ichael Pye 
Introductory 
The modern historical consciousness now prevalent in east and west alike has created 
new tasks and new opportunities in the interpretation of Buddhism and of Christianity. 
This consciousness has two fundamental implications for both traditions which cannot be 
escaped by anybo::ly who serio:..isly reflects on them. The first is that historical criticism 
of the authoritative reference points of faith, especially of the origins of each of the 
two faiths, has long made it impossible to 且nd there any absolute refuge, however 
important those reference points may continue to be in locating the meaning of tradi­
tion. The second is that elementary knowledge of the history of culture makes it im­
possible to maintain an intellectually viable interpretation of one religious tradition in 
grand isolatio11, as if it were sealed off from the influence of all others and as if it had 
no structural analogies with others. The result is that the sense of religim1s superiority 
frequently enjoyed and con1municated by teachers within Buddhism and Christianity is 
no longer excusable. To say this is not to preclude the possibility of preferential judg­
ments in the long run. Nor is it to overlook that cluster of problems still remaining 
for bo�h traditions which may initially be referred to as the question of absoluteness 
(as in Ernst Troeltsch's Die Absolu!hei! des Christentums). It is merely to assert that 
the base-line for contemporary and future interpretations of either Buddhism or Chris­
tianity, or both, must be a recognition of the full availability of both traditions, and 
indeed of other religious traditions and general features of human experience. 
If two traditions or more are held in view while interpretation proceeds, some kind 
of comparative reflection becomes inevitable. Yet this all too easily turns into over­
simplified rejection of the tradition least accessible to the interpreter, or in some cases 
to a naive acclamation of what is alien. Persons attending to these matters may be 
unduly affected by chance features in their own personal development, or they may be 
constrained to adopt certain attitudes because of official positions which they hold in 
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religious organisations. All too often like is not compared with like. :Monologues pass 
each other in the wind. There seems to be a need therefore for some charting of a 
framework for relaxed comparison, some attention given to an appropriate structure 
for reflection, some indication of the range of features which need to be considered. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest an outline which may be useful in this con­
nection and which at least may be thought to have some validity in terms of the study 
of religion as an academic pursuit. 
Relations between Buddhism and Christianity have usually been rather guarded, 
when not actually polemical. The oldest polemical writing is probably the Japanese 
work Ha Daz"usu (i.e. Contra Deum) written in 1620 by the ex-Christian convert Fabian, 
and it remains instructive. Since then eirenic works have also been written, but the 
sense of rivalry has not altogether departed. Influential Christian theologians such as 
Barth and Tillich have reacted to the existence of Buddhism in ways consistent with 
their theologies, but without really grasping the significance of Buddhism in a pmitive 
way. For their part Buddhist writers not infrequently make passing references to 
Christianity which pick on some isolated feature yet betray inadequate understanding 
of the real tensions and strengths in the Christian tradition. For example, it is some­
times supposed that the Buddhist teaching of an{i/加 an (Japanese muga 1瞑我） is a refu­
tation of a presumed central Christian doctrine of the soul, while in reality Christian 
doctrines of the soul or the self are by no means as straightforward as may first ap­
pear, especially if one reckons that early borrowings from Greek thought are not neces· 
sarily essential equipment for Christians in later centuries. 
It might be thought that the best way to get over inadequate and unduly argu· 
mentative relations at the conceptual level would be to abandon them altogether and 
to shift the meeting of the two traditions on to the level of religious practices. One 
thinks here of shared meditation programmes, shared efforts to maintain or develop 
moral standards or shared efforts to secure world peace. There is clearly some merit 
in this course, but only some. The conceptual problems will in fact remain as long 
as humans have heads. Not only that, religious practice or even jissen (文践 'actually
putting into practice') undisputed though its priority may be as an existential concern, 
almost always is found to come trailing ideas, both in Buddhism and in Christianity. 
It is sometimes thought that Buddhism does not have this characteristic, but in reality 
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Buddhist meditation cannot be separated from a Buddhist perception of the way the 
world is, as is clear flom the classic Buddhist meditation instructions. Conceptual 
reflections such as these present ones should therefore be recognised as a form of mental 
work which is in some way relevant to religious practice, and which is indeed at least 
as necessary in its own way as the physical construction of buildings for religious 
purp03es. In short, what might at first seem like a pure reliance on religious practice 
may be a form of self-deceit, though not dishonourable, and may represent a form of 
escapism from difficult but real conceptual questions. 
If such escapism is disallowed, some coherent framework is needed which permits 
the meaning conveyed by each of these two complex traditions to come to light at one 
and the same time. The present argument suggests a framework which is illustrated 
by incidental discussion of some of its features. The reader will realise that substan­
ti ve discussion cannot really go beyond suggestions and pointers in the space of one 
article. In any case it must be admitted that the writer is still reflecting on many of 
the sub-issues which press for treatment in the context of the overall framework, and 
indeed he will probably never achieve the competence to deal with them adequately. 
In terms of the relations between intellectual disciplines it is proposed that the 
key discipline for developing an even-handed approach to the interpretation of Buddhism 
and Christianity is neither Christian theology nor its Buddhist equivalent but the 
historical and comparative study of religion. Taken together, the historical and com­
parative study of religion are the central elements of the scientific study of religion or 
Rel£gionswissenschaft, to which of course various other disciplines contribute in varying 
degree. This discipline proceeds phenomenologically in the sense that it treats the 
experience of the believer as its primary datum, without being sociologically or psycho­
logically reductionist, nor yet adopting a priori positions about the truth or falsity of 
any particular belief system. Thus the historical and comparative study of religion, 
as an intellectual discipline, is able to play a mediating role between the Buddhist and 
Christian traditions, taking each with full seriousness, and providing a basis of 
knowledge, and indeed of understanding, on which renewed interpretative essays can 
build. Naturally the usefulness of this basis will depend on the correctness and judi­
ciousness with which it is developed, so that prior reflection over a wider comparative 
field is also of some significance. 
(3) 
\Vhile academic writing on the nature and structure of religion has suggested many 
variations, the present writer considers that the simplest while most comprehensive 
view of any religious phenomena recognises four interrelated dimensions which together 
constitute the believer's religious experience. These have already been discussed 
elsewhere (Comparat£ve Religion 1972), but in brief they are the conceptual (including 
symbolic, mythic, etc.), the behavioural (including both ritual and moral action as the 
case may be), the social (that is, the social extension of the religion as perceived and 
experienced by its members) and the psychological (here in the limited sense of the 
attitudinal profile and the state of mind and sensibility of the believer). 0£course the 
sociological and psychological study of religion also have a major task of functional 
explanation, but that is secondary to the study of religion phenomenologically conceived. 
These four dimensions are all of equal importance and it is misleading to give priority 
to any one of them. In particular it is unsatisfactory to regard either belief systems 
or ritual and practice systems as the main focus of 'religious experience' as 1s com­
manly done. Neither shoしlld the dimension of sensitivity or feeling be simply equated 
with 'religious experience', as was done in the work of James, Otto and \Vach. This 
error represents a protest.ant emphasis on the value of subjective feeling and no doubt 
illustrates a f undarnenLally healthy reaction to what the protestant tradition has perceived 
as the ritualism and scholasticism of catholicism. lt is of course not without signifi ・
cance when religious believers or practitioners themselves stress the importance of one 
or other of these four dimensions; but at the same time they may noし themselves be 
analytically aware o「the way in which their experience is conveyed through the other 
three. For the observer it is metho�lologically important to maintain aii fo�1r in steady 
view and to see the religious experience of the believer as constituted rn some way or 
other by them all. 
ln addition to these four major dimensions, in terms of which any example of 
religion can be characterised without undue stress. there is what might be considered 
a fifth dimension, namely the extension of the four basic dimensions through time, with 
the resultant patterns and routines which can be observed running through the tradi­
t1ons as historically known to us. It is this fifth dimension, which the believer views 
as tradition and where the observer tries to perceive patterned dynamics, which provides 
the main springboard into new, creative interpretations. If this fifth dimension is 
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clearly perceived and fully used by the practitioners of religion, many of the problems 
caused by an inordinate sense of modernity subside into insignificance. It is only when 
the routines of intermediate tradition ate igno:-ed that a religious message seems to 
have to make a gigantic leap from the time of the origins of the faith, or from some 
presumed age of archaic experience, forward to the consciousness of modern man. 
Even when such leaps are encouraged, as in the work of a Bultmann or of an Eliade 
respectively, the relation of the first meaning to its reception by modern man remains 
extremely problematic. At the same time it could well be ar即ed by theologians and 
their Buddhist conterparts that the values and meanirgs most deeply required by 
humanity today or at an�/ time have all been carried forward in one way or another 
by the complex traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity, which have themselves 
in many ways adopted 1;nodernity and even contributed to it. Thus it is surprising 
that the importance of the workings of tradition, or the dynamics of religion through 
time, has not yet been widely recognised in the literature of the science of religion. 
This fifth dimension of religion is indeed the link between the deep past and the present, 
between messages lost and messages transmitted, between those who have in the past 
perceived the central meanings offered by lhe religions and those who may do so in 
the future. Yet this is already to flex the springboard for further interpretations, and 
before enthusiasm disturbs the picture unduly it is desirable to take a sober view of 
the four elementary dimensions of religion as these appear in Buddhism and in Christia­
nity. In order to illustrate the procedure in outline some reflections will now be offered 
on each of these dimensions in turn. Depending on the point of view· and experience 
of the reader some of the points made will no doubt seem quite elementary and perhaps 
over-simplified; yet that is one of the unavoidable characteristics of a comparative 
approach which seeks to achieve a degree of even-handedness with respect to two tradi­
tions. 
Social dimension 
Christianity belongs to a family of religions, consisting mainly of Judaism, Chris· 
tianity and Islam, which are all strong in consciously intended social meaning. One of 
the keynotes of Israelite and thence Jewish religion has always been Torah; law, that 
is, in the special sense of a law for the people of God which they are bound, in a 
(5)
covencmt with God, to maintain. Torah provided stipulations for all aspects of social 
life, and it represents such a strong identification of religious consciousness with the 
social life of the Jewish people that in modern times it has been considered possible 
by some to 111,aintain Jewishness ,vhile being agnostic or even atheistic in matters of 
belief. In the l\1uslim faith an almost equally strong emphasis on the ordering of social 
life, based on the Koran and subsequent Islamic law, can be seen as a follow-through 
to the Jewish heritage with an opening of the divinely sanctioned order to diverse peoples. 
As to Christianity, the New Testament had already suggested a complex attitude 
towards Torah. This is seen both in tbe Gospels, where Jesus is portrayed as challeng­
ing rigid and repressive applications of Torah which failed to meet human realities and 
needs, and also in the epistles of Paul, where Torah is seen as �omething which binds 
humanity in sin so that man's condition needs to be transformed by grace. Neverthe­
less the growing Christian Church maintained the Old Testament containing the Torah, 
along with the New Testament, as a revelation of God's will, and not only was the 
Church seen as the people of God or as the 'true Israel', but eventually there were at­
tempts to order whole societies in accordance with God's law, the most famous being 
probably the theocracy of Calvin's Geneva. Even when the Christian churches have 
not held politically dominating positions, they have frequently displayed strong social 
concerns, right up to the Industrial :Missions of modern times, which seek not indi­
vidual conversions but the Christianisation or sancti什cation of the very structures of 
industry. The reason for this social concern, whatever form it takes, is that it is a 
central presupposition of Christianity to place a high value on open, loving relc:itions 
bet ween persons deemed to be equal before God. Thus the Church, as the caring com­
munity of the elect, seeks to transform society at large into a moral and caring com­
munity on a wide scale. 
It is easy to contrast these tendencies in Christianity with a picture of Buddhism 
which emphasises impersonality and plays down relations bet,veen persons, hence at­
taching little importance to community. Tillich argued that this was a major difference 
between the tvrn traditions, and even went so far as to say that as a result democracy 
could not be expected to thrive in Buddhist countries. Such a view is probably faulty. 
It has arisen no doubt partly because of some real features of Buddhist teaching which 
may have received more emphasis among western observers than they enjoy in practice 
(6) 
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among Buddhists, and partly because of a strong assumption that it is the community 
of monks alone which contains Buddhists. On this basis it is easy to see Buddhists as 
a series of individuals seeking enlightenment more or less independently from each 
other, and forming a sangha only out of convenience. Yet such a view overlooks the 
real social forms of Buddhism. The presuppositions and ideals of Buddhist social forms 
are indeed different from those of Christianity but that does not mean that they are 
non-existent. Disciples of the Buddha are in fact supposed to aid each other on the path 
to enlightenment, following the example of their teacher, and this mutual support takes 
its main social form in the arrangements for regulating the sangha. The arrangements 
include, in theory at least, the possibility of expulsion, which indicates the serious 
intent of the provisions. A significant feature in the early period and still today in 
Theravada Buddhism is the regular uposatha meeting for self-examination at which 
members' minds are concentrated on the goal which they share. 
Mutual interdependence on the path towards Buddhahood is however a much wider 
concept than if it pertained to the sangha alone. for it extends right through the whole 
natural community which supports the sangha. The support of laity was amost cer· 
tainly elicited and rec�ived during the Buddha's own lifetime, as all ancient sources 
agree, and certainly the Buddhist religion emerged very early as a civilisational force 
and not just a matter to interest a few miscellaneous individ叫s. This ci叫isational
impacL has recently been written up with particular emphasis by Trevor Ling in his 
work The Buddha (which incidentally contains very little about the Buddha himself), 
where the political compacts given classical form in the Asokan model are given pro· 
minence. Indeed from the early legends onwards right through the later history of 
Buddhism it is possible to see a tripartite relationship between sangha, king and people 
in which the sanglla legitimates the monarchy, the king rules the people benevolently, 
while the people in their turn give support to the sangha. This is expressed diagra· 
matically a叫in more detail in the present writer's own short The Buddha. A similar 
pattern was reflected in the Japanese Buddhism of the time of Shotoku Taishi (574-623) 
and indeed again in the recent aspirations of the Nichiren Shoshi:'1 Sぅka Gakkai which 
has taught of a 'third civilisation'(daisan bunmei第三文lリl) and, although politics and 
religion are constitutionally distinct in Japan, of a mysterious union between king and 
Buddha (obutsu myogo :-E仏砂合）．
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However the social extension of Buddhisrrt among the people is not just a question 
of some kind of social or political compact. It has another feature centering on the 
relationship between the sangha and the people, which can be seen as a complex net­
work of karmic relationships, binding together whole families and generations as they 
progress towards enlightenment and nirvana. For this reason aspects of Buddhism 
sometimes known as'popular Buddhism','household Buddhism' or 'funeral Buddhism' 
should not be written off as being merely the performance of necessary social func­
tions. On the contrary this extension of Buddhism should be appreciated as a mean­
ingf ul social dimension of Buddhist experience. Of course not everybody who takes 
part in a routine Buddhist activity is doing so because of an individual intention to 
achieve enlightenment in the near future. Social obligations undoubtedly play a much 
larger part in the minds of those concerned. Nevertheless there is also usually a real 
sense of a karmic connection linking all those who take part. Indeed it is probably 
correct to say that social connections are seen in this perspective as being at the same 
time karmic connections. In the case of Japanese Buddhism one may see here a con­
flation between the connections obtaining between one particular social group within 
society which is essentially limited, and the universalist karmic perspective of Mahayana 
Buddhism in general. It is one of the points at which the social experience of Buddhism 
syncretises with the elemental forces of Japanese society. Similar arguments could be 
advanced with respect to other Buddhist countries. 
Thus the social dimension of Buddhism should be characterised positively on at 
least three levels: relations within the sangha, relations between the sangha and the 
socio-political order, and the sense of karmic continuity, dependence and responsibility 
which pervades the Buddhism of the people. It is only on such a basis that a com­
parative view of the social dimension of Buddhism and Christianity should build. The 
comparative approach should not be developed on the negative basis of pointing out 
what one tradition lacks in terms of the other, but, initially at least, by characterising 
positively what each tradition does entail in its own terms. Equally, this social dirnen­
sion should not be treated in either case as a mere social function, but should be re­
cognised as a value-bearing dimension of experience for those involved. The importance 
of this becomes especially clear if one considers its close relation to the behavioural or 
ritual dimension in which the believer may be caught up at many points in his life. 
、）8 （ 
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Behavioural dimension 
Religious action can be loosely divided into formal rites of various kinds and re­
ligiously patterned behaviour performed in the context of life in general. The former 
is more specific, more evident, more structured, while the latter merges imperceptibly 
into the total range of human behaviour. Both are of considera切e importance in both 
Buddhism and Christianity, so that in a broad sense it is possible to compare like with 
like. 
The overt rites of Buddhism and Christianity have a major underlying similarity 
in that they are the rites of a universal religion of salvation or release which has made 
itself at home in a whole at range of natural societies. In unmixed form the rites of 
such universal religions are quite different from the rites of primal religions which 
have a single social basis. Bearing in mind that both universal and primal religions 
have (1) rites which centre on individuals and (2) rites in which the whole group is 
the main focus, the range of rites can be expressed diagramatically as follows: 
\- - ---------- -- -----―----- ---—--- - ---―-
! I (1) individual focus
,--- --―------- -------—---―-— 
1 (P) Primal \ rites of transition 
J __ . ------- -------- -----—--― --- ------
(U) Universal I rites of 1rntiat1on―- -----一--- -―----- --―----—\ __ _ 
(2) group focus
seasonal rites etc. 
rites of reinforcement 
Rites in the P/1 category are Van Gennep's well known rites of transition (Yi!es de 
jJassage) which see the individual through birth, adolescence, marriage and death. 
Naしurally these are also social rites in the sense that they enable a society to manage 
changes in the relative position of the individuals within it. However they take place 
when the ]if e-stage of specific individuals requires it. By contrast the rites in the P /2 
category ;1re the new year, spring-time and harvest festivals, rites connected with spe· 
cial occupations, and any others which rehearse the needs and aspirations of a single 
society. In a pure state, a universal religion of salvation or release also has two kinds 
of rite. Those which centre on the need of an individual, in category U/1, are above 
all the rites of initiation such as baptism and confirmation in Christianity and receiv­
ing the precepts (Japanese ju!wi受戒） in Buddhism. The so-called initiations of primal 
religion are quite different since they mark the transition from childhood to adulthood 
and are more or less inevitable for all the members of a given society, whereas initia· 
tion in a religion of salvation or release implies voluntary entry into a group 
(9) 
distinct from the natural society of \Vhich the person is also a member. The fact 
that in many situations these two are conflated will be referred to again below. In 
category U/2 may be placed rites which strengthen the select body or celebrate its 
central concerns. In early Buddhism this was above all the ujYJsa!ha, though other rites 
now come into this cat�gory too depending on the sect, while in Christianity the main
rite in this category has been in some form or other the Eucharist or Lord's Supper. 
These rites may be called rites of reinforcement in that they consolidate the position of 
members in their faith and discipline. Naturally this four-fold analysis of rites has a 
very wide application and many other specific examples and variations could be adduced. 
The picture becomes interestingly more complex hO\vever when we consider the 
overall history of Buddhism and Christianity, for the simple reason that as these ex­
tremely adaptable religions spread from region to region and from age to age they 
shared to a varying extent in the functions of primal religion. Thus Christianity rapidly 
developed a religious framework for birth, adolescence, marriage and death, infant 
baptism becoming a birth rite and confirmation becoming an adolescence rite. Similarly 
Buddhism became of great importance as a funeral religion in various countries, while 
in Theravada Buddhism ordination took on a parli<1l role as an adolescent rite for boys 
or young men involving them in separation from society, temporary monkhood and then 
a return to adult household life. In the more dominantly social category P/2 Buddhism 
a叫Christianity also took on a seasonal form. Christmas marked the winter solst1cc, 
;:i_nd Easter marked spring with a popular emphasi:, on natural regeneration evidenced 
by bulbs, eggs, and so on. Christianity also provided agricultural rites in the form of 
Rogation-tide and I― larvest Festival. Buddhism developed less in this respect, leaving 
more room for existing religious systems such c:1s, in the Japanese case, Shimo. However 
Bucldhi:�m has become strongly affected by the sense of cale叫ricity running throughout 
Japanese religion in general. One has only to think of the 108 soundings of Lhc temple 
bells at midnight on New Year's Eve (joya no fume闊立の訃）， signalling the passing 
of the old year, or of the two and a half million folk who make their New Year's visit 
(, , -,1ia1swnude notしo a Shinto shrine, or not only to a Shinto shrine, but also to the 
famous Buddhist Temple Sens6ji, at Asakusa in Tokyo. 
The most common comparative reflection on this state of affairs is that Buddhism 
has usually effected some kind of compromit:3e with the natural religions of its host 
(10) 
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countries, while Christianity, like Islam, has swept away indigenous religious practices 
to dominate the whole of life by itself. \Vhile there is some truth in this, it should 
not be overlooked that Christianity has in fact ingested much regional lore and custom 
in a complex indigenisation process, while the same is true of Islam, especiali y m 
Indonesia. Indeed, since Christianity has if anything produced a greater range of rites 
than Buddhism to suit the primal level of religious needs, the matter could be sしated
quite conversely, though unfashionably, namely that it is Christianity which has shown 
the more comprehensive adaptability, while Buddhism on the whole has maintained a 
more severe distance as a religion of separation and release. However that may be, 
it should be recognised in long-term discussion that the ritual dimension of both Bud· 
dhism and Christianity represents a complex interplay between rituals which facilitate 
the soteriological meaning of the religion over against natural life, and rituals which 
in various ways accommodate to the requirements of natural society. Not only that, 
but most Buddhist and Christian rituals display both of these aspects, so that they can 
only be properly understood in terms of a syncretistic and ambig1.10us function. 
The second main area of religious behaviour is the less formal one of religiously 
motivated action within the believer's total range of ordinary action. On this matter 
reference must be limited here to the question of the status of ethical action in the two 
traditions, for this is often misunderstood in both cases. In the case of Christianity it 
is often presumed that the 1'eligious sanction for ethics is rigidly authoritc1rian. How ・
ever this is a rnislec1ding view which fails to do iustice both to New Testament ma­
terials and lo much of later Christian practice. The whole thrust of Christian ethics 
in the New Testament was towards (a) the interiorisation of law, and (b) the univer­
salisation of law, that is, of course, of religious and ethical law. Jesus is recalied in 
the Gospels as relating divine law to human needs and by no means as simply reas­
serting the Jewish religious law in some new authoritarian fashion. In the case of 
Buddhism it is frequently supposed that ethics are secondary or even irrelevant and that 
Buddhism is essentially an amoral religion. This impression is sometimes reinforced 
by Buddhists themselves, especially in the Zen tradition, who stress that Buddhist 
enlightenment lies beyond the distinction between good and evil. Since the western 
observer usually feels obliged to be interested in enlightenment he may easily overlook 
the fact that the vast majority of Asian Buddhists do not expect early enlightenment. 
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Yet for Buddhists in a pre-enlightement condition, or a pre-nirvanic condition, karmic 
differences do matter, and hence moral g1.1idance is not insignificant. There is indeed 
the broad difference between the two traditions that in Buddhism moral effort is essen­
tially a preliminary, while in Christianity it is usually considered to be contempora· 
neous with and essential to the spiritual life. Nevertheless this difference can be ex­
aggerated. 
The above problem about the status of ethics in the two traditions may arise in 
part simply because ethics are frequently considered as an independent and coherent 
category in their own right. In reality ethics merge into wider questions about the 
assumptions and values of daily life, attitudes towards family life, work, society, and 
so on. Therefore it might be more fruitful to begin whith a more comprehensive 
characterisation of what might be called the meanz."ng-in-life of Buddhism and of Chris· 
tianity, includ�ng reference to ethically conceived behaviour but also to a wider range 
of behaviour less formally but no less importantly inspired by religious values and 
atti tucles. F Jr the present the main point to be noted is that the comparison of Bud· 
dhism and Christianity should not have built into it from the very beginning an anifi· 
cial and misleadingly rigid view of ethics. It is not necessary to expatiate on the 
intimate connections which this dimension of religion clearly has with the psychologi· 
cal and conceptual dimensions to which we now proceed. 
Psychological dimension 
Although this is called the psychological dimension for convenience it should be 
rccc1lled that the expression is used in the limited sense of the states of mind, attitu­
dinal profile and sensibility of the believer. Just as the social dimension considered 
earlier referred lo the social extension of the religion as perceived and experienced by 
the believer, so too does the psychological dimension in this sense refer to the sub­
jective extension of the believer's awareness or sensibility. \Ve are not concerned at 
this point with functional explanations of religion which would correlate religious ex­
perience with non-religious factors such as neurosis or sexual repression, etc. 
This dimension is pal'ticularly difficult to deal with because, while each of the 
four dimensions is in constant relation to the other three, it is in practice all but 
impossible to discuss this dimension at all without speedy reference to the conceptual 
(12)
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dimension. Another difficulty is that it is often all too rapidly assumed that it is this 
dimension which itself alone constitutes religious experience. However it is erroneous 
and misleading to restrict'experience'to the subjective sensibilities os religion, as is 
implied in the title and content of \Villiam James' extremely influential work The 
Varieties of Religious Experience. The experience of the believer is more appropriately 
seen as pervading all four of the dimensions currently being considered. However these 
notes of caution do not mean that the religious consciousness or state of mind is not 
open to consideration. Indeed it would be superficial to ignore it. 
"\Vith this dimension too the comparative picture is not as simple as might at first 
appear. The main constitutive feature common to most phases of Christian sensibility 
is probably a sense of trusting dependence. This has found prominent expression in万
the work of protestant theologians such as Schleiermacher, but the feeling of which he 
wrote has a long heritage and many variations among Christians of almost all per­
suas10ns. C.onnected with this feeling are representative Christian values such as respect 
for personhoocl, desire for truthful speech, love, and so on. For Buddhism the main 
constitutive feature of spirituality can probably be declared to be a sense of detachment. 
This means that religiously directed feeling ranges over the experience of passions and 
しhe experience of the cooling of passions. It may not be inappropriate to say that 
while Christianity involves an acceptance, through suffering, of created existence, which 
in the last analysis is positively affirmed through the sense of resurrection, Buddhism 
by contrast leads to a withdrawing away from facticity or from the specific variety of 
ordinary life, at least in so far as passion-directed attachment is involved. 
In such a brief statement somedoctrinal signposts are inevitably drawn into play 
to indicate these dominant attitudes. However, it may be that the kind of lan堕1age in 
which the attitudes or perceptions are most easily set forth does not do justice to the 
kind of subtlety required for a comparative consideration. For example, second thoughts 
obviously arise with respect to the above brief statement if one considers the nature of 
faith in Pure Land and True Pure Land Buddhism. Tarz"!?i他力after all does mean 
other-power, and it is sincere reliance on the power of the original vow of Amitabha 
Buddha which is given centrality in these cases. It may be said that this sense of 
reliance on lariki is really untypical, while it is the jirild自力of Zen Buddhism which 
is more truly Buddhist. However the reality is that both of these principles are 
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widespread throughout Buddhism as a whole. The starkly accentuated contrast between 
jirild and iari!?i represents a tension found in the de facto altitudes of most Buddhists, 
though usually it is more softly drawn. Thus some modification of the picture first 
drawn above is probably necessary at least from the Buddhist. side. 
The characterisation of Christian feeling probably also needs modification. Above 
all, while a sense of dependent creaturely existence may be viewed as the elementary 
form of Christian sensit.ivit.y, t.he presumed resting place at the end of the Christian 
way (110穴 一a New Testament term) is not life under its present empirical forms, 
but post-resurrection life, which is essentially mysterious. This mystery should not. be 
underestimated as a faclor in Christian sensitivity. Even ,vi1en it is said that resur· 
rection is a reaffirmation of creation, the manner of reaffirmation remains mysterious. 
Moreover since in this mystery finitude is overcome, presumably so too are the con· 
ceptual discriminations which belong to finitude, at least that is, such conceptual cliscri ・
mination which Buddhists regard as an aspect of ignorance in the technical sc-nse. 
Further f ea tu res of Buddhist and Christian feeling which demand car cf u I re什ection
are the attitudes to the self and to the external world (both touched on in principle 
above), the allitude to reason and the role which reason is supposed to play in the 
religious consciousness, and so on. Of course all such reflections tie in closely with 
the problem of making comparisons of a conceptual kind, to which we now しurn.
Conceptual dimension 
The conceptual dimension of religion includes doctrincl.l statements and formulae 
but al らo much more. It refers t.o all mythical c.tncl symbolic projections of religious 
consciousness, including their expression in art of a 11 ki叫s. In terms of ideas 1t 111-
eludes both those which arc しmthinkingly carried over from previous cultures and しhose
which are consciously selected and emphasised in new religious initiatives. Therefore 
it is nol possible to lighl upon t.wo clear-cul sets of doctrines and compare them item 
by it.cm. Many doctrines in both Buddhism and Christianity, if not all, have a complex 
stcl.t.us bccm1se they arise in t.he context of myth, in t.he assumptions and ar忠1rnents of 
a particular time, in symbolic present.at.ion, cl.nd so forth. 
Two further elementary cautions should be made. Firstly, literalislic interpretations 
should not be fastened on lo religious concepts which lhe believers themselves consider 
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subtle or mysterious. This danger is particularly important with regard to the various 
forms of Japanese Buddhism, some of which at first sight appear simplistic and even 
un-Buddhist to western observers. It is also particularly important with respect to some 
central dJctrines of Christianity such as the doctrines of God, creation, incarnation and 
resurrection. The last is an especially instructive case, for the New Testament nar­
ratives on the resurrection of Jesus are themselves contradictory, or as some would say, 
complementary, in treating the resurrection at once as a physical wonder and as a 
mystery. Thomas can feel the wounds of Jesus with his o,vn hands, and Jesus can 
stand among his disciples without entering a room in the normal way. Secondly it 
should not be lightly assumed that there is or even ought to be a sirnple unity of vie,v 
marntained within one religious tradition. Admitledly this may be called for at times 
by representatives of one of the traditions. Thus in theory the Buddhist sangha "is 
supposed to agree about whether or not a particular dialogue or set of sayings represents 
the Leaching of the BuddhJ., as may be inferred from the teaching on authority in the 
J11ahr7jx1rinirvc7na Sutm. Christianity too is supposed to be a religion of unity, and 
schismatic divisions are reckoned by almost all to be a scandal while yet from some 
po111ts of view necessary to preserve true doctrine. The unity of the Church is also 
strongly symbolised by the body of Christ partaken in the Eucharist. The reality is 
however that quite different emphases are possible within each tradition even while they 
remain clearly Christian or Buddhist. Nor do these emphases necessarily contradict 
the kind of unity which is proper to each tradition. For example, Buddhism in one 
phase may emphasise separation from the world, following the Buddha as a model of 
nirvana, whi1e in another phase it might emphasise immersion in ordinary life on the 
basis of recognising the Buclclha-nat.ure of all existence. Christianity may be understood 
essentially as a theocentric faith with Christ playing a secondary role in the action of 
divine providence, but then again it might be understood as radically christocentric, 
with man's knowledge of God being formed mainly through his experience of Christ. 
Such strong cautionary remarks may make the activity of comparison seem too 
hazardous to be worth undertaking. Yet is should not be overlooked that the very 
applicability of these remarks to the two traditions in question itself indicates some 
fundamental similarities. Other basic parallels combine to make comparison unavoida­
ble, even though pitfalls abound. To start at bedrock, both are universal systems for 
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the realisation of meaning in life. Both assume that man has a fundamental problem 
and offer ways of solving it \Vhich include at some point statements about the way the 
world is. This in turn means that both systems are in principle open to some kind of 
philosophical testing, even though both systems have well tried defence habits against 
the probes of independent reason. However the application of philosophical tests of con· 
sistency and meaning goes beyond the initial comparison which can be made on a 
historical and phenomenological basis. Though the statements'about the way the world 
is', to use the common philosophers'phrase, may not always be immediately obvious, 
and the religious person himself, especially on the Buddhist side, may even claim that 
he does not make such. nevertheless there is a sense in which each religion points to 
what is presumed to be the ultimate nature of reality. Furthermore both religions 
propose rather mysterious conclusions about man's destiny, even while allowing less 
mysterious picturesしhereof to communicate these mysteries to the majority. This 
point was already made with respect to the Christian concept of resurrection, but it 
applies equally to related concepts such as 'the kingdom of God' and 'eternal life', 
which both break into ordinary life and go beyond it. The nature of life with God, 
just like the nature of God, can only be approached with the greatest of care. and 
negative terms are frequent. For Buddhism the nature of a Buddha's existence after 
nirvana, if indeed'after'is the right word, remains an undetermined question. Even a 
bodhisattva, still active in the world of ordinary life,'does not lake his stand anywhere' 
(lo use◎ nzc's regular phrase), and indeed cannot without forfeiting the freedom from 
attachments which enables him to release others. Similarly the Son of Man was said 
to have nowhere to lay his head. 
Such ideas may all seem remarkably diverse if closely regarded, yet comparison is 
a.I ways part! y a quc��tion of scale and focus. They may seem much more similar to
each oしher when jointly contrasted with quite different systems such as the Shinto 
religion or rationalist or political ideologies. In so far as there are similarities it may be 
preferable to approach them by means of a neutral structure of some kind, for example 
by elucidating each system in terms of the pattern: man's present condition, the condition 
seen as a goal or aspiration, and the route or method for realising the aspired condition. 
It is however very difficult to devise such a structure which does not already imply 
some kind of doctrinal nuance. It would be helpful to move through a series of focuses, 
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some of which are right for the broader scale of comparison but known to be deficient 
in some respects, and others of which are suitable for attending to the comparison of 
more detailed points but which run the danger of overlooking major similarities. 
Whatever the scope of a comparative reflection the conceptual dimension of religion 
should always be recognised as containing a wide range of conceptual activity includ­
ing philosophically refined doctrine, myth and symbol, semi-explicit assumptions and 
popular belief-systems which in one way or another convey, or betray, the central con­
cerns of the tradition in question. It should also be remembered that the conceptual 
dimension of religion constantly moves together with religious feeling or spiritual stance, 
with some kind of socio-religious extension experienced by the believer, and with 
religious action of various kinds. It is not really possible specifically to refer to all 
of these at once, simply because of the limited nature of speech or writing. However 
reflection on one dimension should never proceed in such a way that it performs an 
injustice with respect to another. Furthermore all four of these dimensions are subject 
to change as a matter of course; which leads to consideration of the fifth dimension. 
The fifth dimension 
Since religion is subject to the passage of time religious leaders and believers are 
forced to respond to ever-lengthening perspectives. In particular the transmission of 
religion from one culture to another whether geographically or chronologically means 
that new cultural elements are introduced to the tradition and new demands are made 
upon it. Two of the strongest religious drives relevant to such shifts of tradition are 
(a) mission, and (b) reform. Though both of these concepts have played a classical
role in the way in which the history of the Christian Church has been perceived, they 
are both equally relevant to Buddhism. Both of these drives are more or less widely 
present at the level of conscious reflection among teachers and preachers in the two 
religions, and to a lesser degree among the believers generally. Less clearly understood, 
though no less important for an understanding of the nature of religious tradition are 
(a) the way in which the elements of one religious tradition coexist, from time to time,
with other religious and cultural elements of various kinds (see syncretism, below), 
and (b) the procedures by which the available resources of a tradition are selected and 
interpreted by its exponents (see hermeneutics, below). It is thought that these four 
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categories together, though not all of quite the same provenance or status, may be 
adequate to aid the discernment of those patterns in religious change and religious 
consistency which can summarily be described as the dynamics of religious tradition. 
As to the categories of mission and reform, it may be held that these are not ap· 
propriate to Buddhism, and indeed it is regrettable that both are drawn from common 
use in the history of Christianity. If more neutrally derived alternatives can be pro· 
duced, so much the better. Nevertheless the facts of religious history are that both 
Buddhism and Christianity have been in principle missionary religions. Indeed this 
arises from their very nature as universalist religions of salvation or release. In Chris· 
tianity man is commonly viewed as bound by sin and therefore needing to be brought 
to a renewed and rectified relationship with God, while in Buddhism man is viev-.red as 
bound by karma and ignorance and therefore in need of teaching and other help to be 
brought to a state of release or nirvana. Hence those involved in either religion are 
called upon to receive, and to transmit. That Christianity requires this is clearly indi­
cated in the New Testament (e.g. Ji.lfa!thew 28; 18-20 and john 20; 23, the latter being 
a commission to forgive sins). It is less commonly realised among observers that there 
is a canonical basis for such involvement in transmission in Buddhism too, though of 
a rather different kind. It lies in the Buddha's very decision to teach anybody at all, 
for at first he was inclined not to. This decision, described in legendary form in the 
.l\1a I頑vagga of the Pali Books of Discipline, provides a theoretical beginning for the 
outward spread of Buddhism based on the Buddha's own resolve. The legend was taken 
up again in the early Mahayana Lutus S砂·a, with interesting glosses on the degree of 
understanding to be expected from his hearers a叫the modifications which the teaching 
would therefore require. 
It is also quite clear that Buddhism as well as Christianity has been su bJect to 
reform movements, which seem to be more or less universally evident in founded 
religions. Again there is a strong inherent drive, even lo the point of religious compe­
ti lion, io seek a correct and effective statement of the presumed origin a I faith. \Vhile 
reformation is closely linked with protestantism in the minds of historians of Christi­
anity, perhaps more consideration should be given lo reform motivation in the develop­
ment of catholicism. In the case of Buddhism reform has been paradoxically linked 
with development in the case of the origins of the Mahayana as a distinct movement. 
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This is also true for later exponents of Mahayana, perhaps the most striking cases 
being the exponents .of Zen Buddhism and the fiery Japanese Nichiren, who is certainly 
better seen as a reformer than as a 'prophet'(contra Anesaki). 
There are no doubt many features of both mission and reform which deserve detailed 
comparative study, but the point being made here is that the two together have a 
tremendous impact on the overall pattern of each tradition. Both lead to new elements 
becoming a part of the overall tradition so that the sorting and selection process becomes 
ever more complex for later generations. This developing richness of the traditions 
eventually demands more widely based theoretical analyses (a) of the manner in which 
religious and other elements are correlated with each other, and (b) the procedures by 
which the meanings of the traditions are elucidated. 
For the first of these a proper analysis of syncretism is required. The main points 
of such an analysis have already been broached (see the present writer's 'Syncretism 
and Arn biguity', Numen XVIII 2, 1971), and indeed the matter has been taken up 
rather diff ere叫y by others (e. g. Carsten Colpe's'Syncretism and Secularisation: Com­
plementary and Antithetical Trends in New Religious l\1ovements ?' History of Religions, 
17, 2, 1977). Although the matter remains rather confused in the available literature, 
it does seem evident that a good theory of syncretism is needed to make sense of a 
range of interconnected problems. These include questions a bout indigenisation and 
acculturation (including the acquisition by universalist religions of rites otherwise pro­
vided in primal religions, discussed briefly above) and also questions about the linking 
and dropping of diverse religious and other elements, the formation of new religions, 
and so on. 
An understanding of the dynamics of religious tradition with the help of such con-
cepts can lead the observer very close to the interests and aspirations of the believers 
and exponents of the tradition. However even if the above were to be systematically 
achieved it would still be possible to come one step closer. This would be by sharing 
in the analysis of the procedures of interpretation employed by religious persons them­
selves, not forgetting that the latter are nowadays more than ever before sophisticated 
observers of themselves. This understanding of the work of the interpreters is called 
hermeneutics, though the term also has a history of extension to the practice of inter­
pretation itself, and an attempt to broach this kind of study in a comparative way has 
(19)
also been inade elsewhere With special reference to Buddhism and Christianity (The 
Cardinal 111eaning, 1973, with Robert :Morgan et al.). At such points the comparative 
study of religion can easily become a springboard for sharing in the interpretative 
efforts of today and tomorrow; At the same time the autonomous integrity of hiDtorical 
and comparative study should be carefully maintained, for otherwise the very value of 
the analysis will be lost. 
Conclusion 
It is hoped that the overall pattern of analysis set out above may be useful in 
providing a sufficiently simple, yet comprehensive and integrated framework for more 
sustained and detailed comparative work. The specialist reader will no doubt detect 
many points at which the argument is indebted to others, even where issue is taken, 
and this debt is gratefully acknowledged. Jt seemed important however not to obscure 
the structure of the argument with numerous references, since the argument is essen­
tially a general one. Similarly the reflections offered under the five dimensions perceived 
are illustrative and often cautionary in intent. They suggest the kind of agenda appro­
priate to the discussion of each dimension, and, incipiently, the relations which should 
obtain bet�、reen the various phases of comparison. Ideally each dimension is linked 
with all the others, but this is difficult to exhibit constantly. In particular it ::,hould 
be noted that the fifth dimension, that of the dynamics of religious tradition, is I inked 
all the time to the other four, which together should be seen dynamically. lt 1s an 
understanding of the dynamics of religion which brings the observer closest to the 
value-forming character of contemporary religious experience. 
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